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Summary
A large part of EU's export refunds are awarded through tender procedures. We apply auction
theory to model the traders' behavior for weekly tenders of soft wheat interuention sfocks.
Specification and estimation of the optimal bidding strategy are developed under two opposing
assumptions about the traders' valuation of grain, each conesponding to a pafticular functioning
of international soft wheat and related markets. This structural approach allows us to conclude
that this market is relatively competitive.
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lntroduction
Within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), export refunds and import levies are the major
tools of trade regulation with third countries. Two-thirds of European grain expenditures 1 were
concerned with these export refunds, which account for ten percent of the total agricultural
budget. The 1992 CAP reform aims to reduce these costs by bringing down internal prices in
order to reach a level close to the world price. But export refund awarding procedures remain
the only instrument that allows a direct control of European exports, of both quantities and
public costs.
The European Union (EU) has used different procedures in variable proportion over time,
searching for the most efficient - and the least costly - export policy. To bridge the gap between
the domestic price and the world price, the European Commission (EC) can resort to several
kinds of subsidies, according to the origin of cereals (intervention stocks which are the property
of the Union or private stocks), and their destination. The EC can use standing refunds, which
are generally available without limitation on quântity, and export refunds which are tendered
for. ln the latter case, competition between traders simultaneously settles the unitary refund
level and the quantity to be exported.
Whatever procedure is used by the Commission, three criteria are taken into account: the
quantity to be exported (for a week, and for the whole marketing year), the budgetary cost of
export financing, and the European Union export objectives, that is its willingness to save or
gain market shares. That leads the Commission to anticipate various key variables: world
supply and demand evolution, subsidies of other exporting countries, world prices, and
European public and private stocks. At the same time, traders have to form expectations about
the same variables. Depending upon these expectations, they determine their optimal bidding
behavior, in terms of refunds for the open market or in terms of purchase price for intervention
stocks.
This paper deals with the analysis of European export refund which are tendered for. Our
objective is to determine the traders' valuation of the tendered cereals. ln this respect, two
opposite assumptions can be considered. First, grain has a different and a particular value for
each trader. Consequently, each trader considers his own value when bidding. This assumption
is referred to as the private value paradigm. Conversely, the second assumption is that the
object has a common value for all bidders ex posf, but this value is unknown ex ante. Before
bidding, traders simply form an estimate of this common value. Among traders, estimates are
different according to the information they get. Under this second paradigm, a bidder adjusts
his strategy to his own estimate and prior belief about the others' estimates.
1 Expod refunds account for 50 percent of European grain expenditures in the new CAp
'l
Drawing conclusions about each of the two competing assumptions gives information about the
organization of the world grain market. lf the private value assumption turns out to be correct,
that reveals possible segmentation of the world market, in which each trader has a specific
market power (according to the specific geographical area he currently serves, for example).
Existence of private values can also be the result of speculative behaviors: on the one hand,
traders compete to get export contracts, and on the other hand they contest export refunds to
hold these contracts. An imbalance between these two markets can produce different
valuations for the same object, according to traders. Moreover, interactions with other related
markets, such as grain futures markets, lead to a complex organisation which may create
heterogenous valuations.2
ln the case of the common value paradigm, trade appears to be the result of an unique and
homogenous world market. But, the common value assumption does not necessarily provide
the proof of the "law of the one-price" on the world market. lt would just mean that traders
determine their optimal bidding as if the object has - ex-posf - the same value. So, the
existence of related markets does not exclude the common value assumption. ln this case, an
equilibrium is established between these different markets, on average.
Our purpose is not to give an accurate representation of the complexity of the world grain and
related markets as a whole, but simply to characterize the main features of traders' behaviors,
and then of the world grain market. This can be done within the two contrasting (and therefore
illustrative) assumptions on grain valuation. For this purpose, we develop an empirical method
simply based on an ordinary least squares estimator (further calculations are necessary to
obtain a complete estimation of latent distributions). However, it is not possible to decide
between the two paradigms with a statisticaltest, because both structural models simplify to the
same reduced form and therefore conclusions have to be drawn via economic considerations
only. Estimation results, and then characterization of behaviors under the both paradigms, will
provide us for these economic considerations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a presentation of the EU awarding policy.
Section 2 summarizes auction theory which can be used to model tenders and section 3 is
devoted to econometrics. ln this latter section we present a method which permits the
estimation of the two competing models. Lastly, seclion 4 presents an empirical application of
this method to tenders involving soft wheat intervention stocks.
2 Note th"t there are bilateral agreements too, where political considerations prevail over market cleaing.
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1. Awarding of cereal export refunds
ln the internal market, the European Union sets a market floor price (or intervention price)
which is, in fact, a target price for intra-EU trade. Farmers can sell their products to the
intervention authorities at this annually adjusted intervention price. Then, grain held in
intervention stores is disposed of on the domestic market or through export.
Generally, the world price is considerably less than the European price. To ensure its export
competitiveness, traders are given a refund, which makes up for the difference between the
world price and the European internal price. This refund is not a simple and direct
compensation, because the world price is itself the result of subsidies awarded by the EU and
the other countries (Bonus lncentive Commodity Export Program, then Export Enhancement
Program - EEP - in the United States, for example).
The result of these policies is that export prices on the world market are, on average, very
close. This can be seen through the comparison between the European (fob Rouen) export
price of awarded lots of soft wheat intervention stocks, and the US export price of hard red
winter (HRW wheat, which is one of the most representative world prices (see figure 1).3
Figure 1
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pfob is the fob-EU export price of soft wheat intervention stocks, which can be obtained by
traders for each lot, according to the purchase price they paid to the Commission
(source: European Commission data).
hrw is the US fob gulf export price of HRW sofi wheat, minus an average bonus, but including
an average freight rate from the US to Western Europe (note that the HRW soft wheat is
of slightly higher quality than European wheat (source: lntemationalWheat Council data).
3 HRW ,trornts for about 50 percent of l.JS wheat expotts.
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Two major instruments are used by the European Commission to award refunds. Firstly, fixed
or standing refunds, for which the unitary subsidy is constant and can be awarded for any
quantity. Secondly, tenders, that allow the EC to set refunds and quantities, according to the
traders' bids (Ferret, 1991 ; Agra Europe, 1994).
At the beginning of the CAP, the European Commission only provided for the use of standing
refunds. However, their fixity permitted important gains for the traders when the world price
fluctuated too much. ln such cases, it was not possible to adjust the refund immediately.
Moreover, it was difficult to control exported quantities within this standing refund procedure.
So this procedure was gradually given up in favor of tenders. Tenders have been established in
the mid seventies. Tenders facilitate competition among traders and consequently reduce the
unitary refund. ln addition, tenders simultaneously allow control of the export price, which
reflects the commercial policy of the European Union, and of quantity (price and quantity finally
determine the budgetary cost). Nowadays, fixed refunds are still used, but they concern specific
destinations for which there are not refunds tendered for, especially close-to-home countries.
For these countries, a high level of subsidy is not needed. For other destinations which are
covered by refunds awarded through tenders, fixed refunds exist but are lower than refunds
which are tendered for. They allow traders who have << short hedge > positions and who can not
get higher refunds through tenders, to hold their contracts with a minimum loss.
1.1. Tender procedures
There are two tender procedures which, in the case of soft wheat, are used at least for 50
percent of European exports (55 % from 1989 to 1993). The sharing of tenders between
intervention stocks and the open market depends on both the world and European markets.
Thus, high levels of intervention stocks and a weak absorption capacity of the internal market
lead the EU to dispose of its stocks on the world market. Then, quantities concerned by open
market tenders are residually fixed.
lntervention stock awards are generally concentrated at the beginning and at the end of the
marketing year (see figure 2). lntervention stock awards are between 40 to 70 percent of wheat
export licences from May to September, but often zero in the middle of the marketing year.
Such a regularity is not observed for open market tenders. For the three last marketing years,
intervention stock awarding represents 20 percent of wheat exports, and open market tenders
less than 40 percent.
For both tender procedures, bids are anonymously submitted to the Cereals Management
Committee which executes the cereals Commission policy.
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Tenders for intervention stocks
lntervention stocks are tendered for by lots. Tenders take place each week, and they concern
several lots at the same time. For one lot, each trader makes a per (metric) tonne sealed-bid.
The bidding price is determined by keeping in mind the necessity of selling the lot on the world
market at a competitive price.
ln practice, the European Commission retains the highest bid for each lot and then, because
several lots are involved, the highest bids are grouped together and ranked from highest to
lowest. The Commission fixes a floor level, and allthe bids higherthan this levelare accepted.
This level corresponds to the minimum price the Commission judges acceptable, based on the
offers made. At the same time, it corresponds to the maximum quantity it wants to export.
Open market tenders
ln the case of open market tenders, the Commission buys an export service from traders who
have to stock up on grain from within the internal market. The tenderer must specify the
quantity he intends to export and the desired export refund. This refund reflects the subsidy
level which is necessary to export to the world market, according to each tenderer (that is, in
function of his supplying cost within the internal market).
Each week, the Committee lists the traders' proposals in increasing order of desired refunds,
and adds up the quantities associated with them. The Committee fixes a maximum export
refund, according to the export price that refund involves and according to the corresponding
total quantity to be exported. A contract is awarded to any tenderer who has tendered for a rate
of refund equal to or less than the maximum refund. Traders get the proposed refund (not the
maximum one) if the obligation of export is fulfilled.
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1.2. World grain and related markets
The world grain market is organised around a few excess-supply countries (the five < majors >,
US, EU, Canada, Australia and Argentina) which make up the deficits of the rest of the world.
Supplies and demands are connected by a few international companies who simultaneously act
all over the world. Those who intend to export from the EU have to take into account some
specific variables related to the CAP, especially the way the European Commission awards the
necessary refunds and the corresponding export certificates. ln this respect, two main features
have to be noticed. First, a refund, which is an export authorization, can be sold to another
trader. Such a cession is very current (Court of Auditors of the European Communities, 1990;
Debatisse, 1981). Second, traders have to hedge in futures markets, and such a need generally
leads to speculative operations.
On the one hand, a market for refunds has appeared since the middle of the seventies
(Debatisse, 1984) because the European regulations permit to transfer rights (but not
obligations) deriving from export certificates. lf, after the date a refund has been awarded, the
export price in the world market decreases considerably, it may be in an exporter'interest to sell
his refund to another trader rather than to obtain e contract at the current conditions, causing
him a large loss. Otherwise traders can also bid to get refunds for speculation only, without
intending to export effectively (Debatisse, 1981). Because of the possibility of re-selling
refunds, and because of the possibility of hedging in futures markets, speculation against the
Commission is one-way.
On the other hand, due to time-lags between the date of getting refunds and the date export is
effective, traders have to protect themselves from (and generally speculate with) fluctuations in
the effective export price, in the US dollar/ECU exchange rate (all grain transactions in the
world market are paid in US dollars), and in the freight rates.
Generally, they cover their risks by hedging in futures markets. To cover the risk of price
fluctuations, traders hedge in grain futures markets, especially in Chicago.4 Similar operations
are used to cover the risks of exchange rate and freight costs variations. Then refunds awarded
the same day may lead to different contracts in terms of dates of effective exports, prices and
associated costs.
Motivations to hedge in futures markets are the followings. Suppose that a trader gets a refund
after bidding for EC weekly tenders, but has not yet an export contract corresponding to this
refund. Then he has to fear a decrease of the export price, because in this case the refund will
not be sufficient.
4 Th" Chi"ago Board ol Trade is the major futures market tor grain transactions. Some otherc exist in North-Ameica(Kansas-City, Minneapolis, Wnnipeg), but only one in Europe, which is of lower impoftance (the London Grain Futures
Market, within the Baltic Mercantile and Shipping Exhange).
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Consequently, at the same moment he gets his refund, the trader sells futures for the same
amount of grain, say a four-month contract. ln the case he finds only a low price contract to
hold his refund engagement, he can buy back his futures contract and make a profit, due to the
simultaneous price decrease in the futures market. At least, this gain covers the loss in terms of
refunds. Of course, if the export price increases, the refund he got few weeks or few months
ago may allow for a larger profit.
Conversely, a trader may be in a < short hedge > position. That is he has a contract with a
purchaser which obliges him to export at a due date, but he has no refund to fulfill this contract.
Then, to cover the risk of a price decrease, he hedges by buying futures. The day he gets the
refund, he sells back his futures contract if the refund is at a lower level than necessary.
All these markets to export grain (European market of refunds and certificates, competition
among traders to get refunds from the Commission through tenders, and grain futures markets)
may lead to valuations that differ among traders because of the different situations each of
them can face, for a similar export operation. Moreover, some kind of specialisation exists
among traders, in terms of grain quality or export destinations (Pivot, 1983, p. 149), that can
lead to a real segmentation of the world market.
Some imperfect competition may occur in addition to the specialisation phenomenon, due to
secondary markets. Besides the principal market, where the majority of transactions is made,
secondary markets exist where the price is partially independent and where trader can act
significantly upon the formation of this price (Debatisse, 1984). Existence of these secondary
markets generally derives from shortcomings in the diffusion of information, and from
shortcomings in transport organisation (Debatisse, 1984, p. 271).
This brief presentation of the world grain market shows that European refunds awarding relies
on a complex market organisation. Does the world grain market react as if it were composed of
supplies and demands which interact in a competitive way, so that only one price should
prevail? This would seem to be the case, as only a few local markets, especially the Chicago
Board of Trade, appear to influence the behavior and expectations of all agents. Then, the
common value assumption may prevail. On the other hand, various interactions between
markets (physical, futures, and so on) and time lags between realisations of operations (e.g.
getting refunds and effective export) would indicate that traders may have different
expectations on the valuation of grain they intend to export.s At best, a perfect equilibrium
between these markets (market of refunds, market of re-selling refunds, futures markets,
physical markets) may lead to an unique and homogenous world valuation (and then the
common value assumption may turn out to be correct). However a certain degree of imbalance
would lead to different valuations.
5 SegmenfaÛb n of the wotld market on fhe ôasrb of diflercnt quatities or destinations does not tead to different pivate
values among traders who bid to get a refund, as far as the refunds appty to homogenous items.
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Thus, it seems particularly interesting to develop an approach in order to deal with this
valuation problem. This approach is not meant to reflect all the previously described complex
interactions, but just to give a characterization of their effects on the general organisation of the
world grain market. That will be done through modelling the behavior of traders who bid to get
refunds, within the two contrasting and illustrative assumptions about the grain valuation.
2. Auctions modelling
This section is devoted to a brief presentation of auction theory within the two competing
paradigms of private and common valuation of the bidded object. For a more detailed
description, the interested readercan refertothe McAfee and McMillan, 1987; orWilson, 1992,
surveys. ln the following, we refer to "principal" as the designer of the auction who wants to sell
a single object and "bidders" as the possible opponent buyers (we assume that there is no
coalition among them. For an analysis of this point, see Graham et a|.,1990). An auction is
compared to a game, defined by an allocation rule (in most cases, the principal sells the object
to the bidder who has made the highest proposal) and a payment rule (for example, he can
decide that the price will be the highest announced bid: in this case, he organizes a first price
auction; or the price can be the second highest bid). The problem is to determine the expected
behavior of a risk neutral bidder i confronted with these rules. We shall consider a first price
sealed bid auction, which corresponds to tender procedures. As indicated, the literature on
auctions has exposed two opposite approaches concerning biddeds individual valuation of the
object.6 We shall derive optimal strategies within the private value paradigm, with the extra
assumption that the bidders are identical (symmetry assumption).
Within the private value assumption, an individual i who wins the auction (i.e. his bid is the
highest one) will gain from the difference between his announced bid b, and his valuation of the
object v,. Consequently, his expected gain fI, depends on his private valuation vi, his bid b,, and
the total set of the announced bids b_1=(b)1a.The expression of his profit is, for particular
values of v,,b,,b_,:.
nlvobob_) = lvi - bil 1 g p, o7o) (1)
where 11rl is the indicator function that equals 1 if co occurs, 0 otherwise.
Each individual determines his bid b, to maximize his expected gain. But, while each bidder
knows his own valuation of the item, this valuation is unknown by other bidders, who, given the
assumption of independently distributed private values, cannot rely on their own valuations to
estimate it. For the other bidders, the private value of the individuali is a random variable V;
(we assume that the cumulative distribution function F; of this random variable is common
6 Mitgro, and Weber, 1982, provide a generalization of these two opposite assumptions.
8
knowledge). For a particular realization (v)g,...,n of the random variables (Vù=r,...,n,a Nash
equilibrium of the auction game is defined by n bids (bfu=,,...,r, so that it is not in the interest of
any bidder to individually modify his offer. Considering all possible values of the stochastic
variable (V)j=r, 
.,n,an auction game (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium is consequently defined by n
bid function s lbi)fu 
, ..,n.
To determine such an equilibrium, we shall characterize the bid functions ô1.). We assume that
they are increasing functions of the individual valuations yj:
b, 
= 
blv) with D;(.) > 0 (Vi = 1,...,n).
Given that private values are stochastic, individual bids are random variables denoted by BF
blv). lt the bidder i is risk neutral, he will be interested in his expected gain:
Elldvpb) = E[(vi - b) 1g H, oicoplVi= vil
= (vi- b) Ellp i*i, i6oflVi= vil
= (vi- bù Pwi@6bùlVi= vl
where EIXVi= vi and Plorlyi= vildenote respectivelythe expectation of the random variableX
and the probability of the event ro, given that Vi takes the value vi. lf the other bidders follow
their equilibrium strategies Br1, the expected surplus of bidder i becomes:
E[l{vi,b) = (vi- q PInÈdB;<bùlVi= v)
lncreasing Ojt.) nas an inverse function Tt<.1. When applied to stochastic equilibrium bids Bi,
it generates the private value stochastic variable Vr. Consequenfly :
Etrdveb) = (vi- n) epi*(v6oi-'{oS11v,= r7 e)
with, uncler the independence assumption:
efii*g,<ni-t @it)lv,= uil = efi;*dv1oi -t(o))l =flnyv,.oy-t (o))
and with the symmetry assumption
ili.f <vgi-' (r)) = lT*7rr;o* -' (o)) = [F(b. -1 (b))r^l
When the other bidders follow their equilibrium strategies, expected profit of individual i is then:
En{v1,b) = (vi- O.;1rp" -1 ptr11È1
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Assuming that b.(.) is differentiable, a necessary condition for a bid ô; = b*(vù to be optimal is
provided by:
ôElI{v,,b)
=Qôbi bi= o'(vi)
fro.tçrtt",1l^t I = r, furgSf'
which is a first order differential equation, the solution of which is:
f i n1yyut1,b*1vtr=v1-ftrrr (3)
where vo is the principal reservation value (that is, the minimum value of acceptable bids). The
expression of the optimal bid (3) can also be written:
b*çvS = E[max(vs, V1n-t1)lVç1= v] (4)
where V1n1 is the (random variable of the) highest private value and Vt*rt the second one.
Consequently, the optimal strategy of the bidder i is to bid the expected value of the second
highest bid, assuming that the first one is his own valuation.
Now, consider the case where the principal proposes an item which is worth the same value c
for all bidders (for example, its resale market value). This value is unknown at the time of the
auction. Each bidder is supposed to be able to calculate a personal estimation of the common
value c. We denote a, the realization of the random variable A, of such an estimate by the
individual i, and assume that all these expectations are conditional upon the ex posf common
value c. ln competing in a sealed bid auction, a bidder i cannot observe the behavior of others
and therefore cannot improve his own valuation during the process of the game. However, if he
presumes that his offer \ is the highest one, he is obliged to attach probabilities to other
bidders' estimated values. That induces refinements of his own valuation of the object.
The same type of reasoning previously developped in the private value paradigm gives the first
order condition for an equilibrium strategy (see, e.9., Levin and Smith, 1g91):
Ic-b ta)l(n-1 ) f(a )C=c) [F(a llC=c)ln-za4qA 7 a7
lF(a)c=Qln-ta4qe7 a7b*1a; =
10
(5)
3. An Ordinary Least Squares Estimator
The literature provides many estimation methods to determine latent distributions of private
values or signals (see, e.9., Paarsch, 1992, 1994, or Laffont and Vuong, 1993). Here, we
develop a simple method that relies on ordinary least squares to estimate both models, under
the assumption of normality and log-normality of the private values (resp. signals of the
common value) paradigm. The point to be noted is that it is not possible to discriminate
between the opposite paradigms statistically: both structural models lead to the same reduced
form to be estimated.
For example, assume a normal distribution of either the private values, or the signals of the
common value. Then:
Epl'1= f,Unrn* rpop
within the private values paradigm (o, is the
standard deviation of the private values, f[o
ps z1ç lheir mathematical expectation)k=0
, K within the common value paradigm (o" is the
E(bi) = 1, or rn I Kcoc standard deviation of the signats, Lf;=oo* ,'*R=o their mathematical expectation)
For a given number of bidders, r, âfld Kc are constant terms and B and 0(, are two vectors of
parameters that differ only by the term relative to the constant. That is, Ê = (Êo ô) and a, = (a6 ô)
where ô is a vector of K parameters that affect non constant exogenous variables, and p6 (resp.
as) is the constant term of the mathematical expectation of the private values (resp. signals).
Then, it is the same regression of b" against the vector of exogenous variables that gives an
estimate of the vector ô and the constant term of both models. Additional calculations are
necessary to compute oo âfld o", âttd then to derive ps and c{,0.
We will briefly present some explanation in this section. More details can be found in
Bourgeon,1994.
3.1. Private values paradigm
Assume that private values of the n bidders follow the same distribution function F,, for each
auction /. The private value paradigm permits us to simplify expression elOlv). ln this case, as
proposed by Laffont, Ossard and Vuong, 1991, one can apply the Revenue-Equivalence
Theorem (Myerson, 1981), which states that the sellefs expected revenue e1O)"y is the same
whether a first or second price auction is designed. Thus, one can write (see also (4)):
E@l'1 = E(max (yo, yr,-rù)
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where vlny is the highest private value, and v1n_r) the second one. Assuming that the seller does
not set a reservation price, we obtain:
EPI'1= E(v1n-rù
= I I v1*r14(vrrù... f{v6y) dvx1...dvp1
= ! n@-1) uF [u1u2 f,(u)(1 -F {u))d u
= JudFp@)
where F2 is the cdf of the second highest private value of the lh auction.
Assuming that, for each auction /, private values follow a normal distribution with mean Vt= ztF
2
and variance ol, one can show that the mathematical expectation of the winning bids is the
linear expression:
Epll = /:t", t + -vù dtoz(91
=Vt+ oprtt
(6)
where: fr'' = I2r dt@z(o]
and <D2 is the cdf of the second highest random variable among n standard normal random
variables, i.e. (where O stands forthe cdf of the standard normal):
(Dz(o 
= n o(0n-1[1 - o(01 + @(0'
Consequenly, k1 is the expected value of the second highest random variable among n
standard normals and, for a given number n of bidders, L, is a constant 7 . We can estimate the
latent distribution of the private values with a linear regression. But, if Vt= Fo + zi ô (with p = (Êo
ô) and zr = (1 zi)), such an estimation does not allow us to directly identify the standard
deviation oo, but only the constant Do + o.p[r, and the vector ô. To determine all the parameters
of the latent distribution, it is also necessary to express oo. This can be done from the standard
deviation of the winning bids. lf ôu* is an estimation of the standard deviation of the winning
bids, then an estimation of oo is given by:
1
ôp = ô6" I-\xr- xi
7 For n greater than 3 bidders, this expression is positive. Then the mathematica! expectation of the winning bids is greater
than the mathematical expectation of the pivate vatues. Futthermore, this expression increases witi tne number of
bidders.
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where k2 is a constant that is defined by
î,,=*+ (:t' alo(ot' 
- D -#(:t4o(ot-')'
3.2. Common value paradigm
We will see here how the same linear estimation can give parameters of the common value
model and of the private values model (except the constant terms and the standard deviations
of the signals or of the private values).
Assume that signals ây ârê nonnâlly distributed with mean q = 21 u (z1is a vector of explanatory
variables of the signals, o is a vector of parameterg and variance ol. fn" theoretical winning
bid is given by (see Levin and Smith, 1991; Wilson, 1992):
OI = 
"I - or,n oc + p exp(- k1 al I or)
where:
af ls tne winner's signal,
w
X, = I\t dto(01' is the expectation of the winner's standardized signal P"),
^^A -. - 
I:t' awirf)r 
- 
x,anoorn=Err** =6
It is possible to show that the mathematical expectation of the winning bids is:
E@l'1 = cr- ,,ffi + p exp(- x. c,t oàJ\exp(- k10 dt@(01'
where Ulry is the order statistic < highest value among n realizations of a standard normal ). p
is always less than or equal to zero. Then the mathematical expectation of the winning bids is
always less than the mathematical expectation of the signals. That is, on average, a winner
never losses money wlthin this paradigm.
ln the case of a linear optimal bid function (that is when p = 0), the mathematical expectation of
the winning bids is a linear function of the mathematical expectation of the signals:
Epll = c1- aç(up - k1)
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(7)
For a given number of bidders, (un 
- 
kù is a constant. So, it is possible to get an estimation of
b*with ordinary least squares. lf q= crg + zjô (with o = (coô) andz1= (1 z'ù, such an estimation
does not allow us to directly identify the standard deviation o", but only the constant crs 
- 
oç(cra
- 
k1), and the vector ô.
lf the set of explanatory variables is the same whether we assume the private values paradigm
or the common value paradigm, the same least squares estimation gives the same parameters
for these variables (that is with the regression of b" against z, which has to be considered either
as the set of explanatory variables of the private values, either as the set of explanatory
variables of the signals). Only the constant terms and the standard deviation of private values
in the first case, and of the signals in the second case, have to be derived in a different way.
Here, within the common value assumption, and with Ê = 0 (linearstrategy), the variance of the
signals is proportional to the variance of the winning bids:
v"r@i)2
oc = Var(W
Then an estimation of the standard deviation of the signals is given by:
1
ôp = ôo* {k,-
Var(Uç) is always less than one. Then the variance of the signals is always larger than the
variance of the winning bids. And the larger is the number of bidders, the larger is the multiplier
llVar(Ux), i.e., the larger is the variance of the signals relatively to the variance of the winning
bids.
Expressions of mathematical expectations of the winning bids, and approximations of their
standard deviations, are presented in the following diagram, under the both paradigms, and
under two assumptions about the distributions of private values or signals of the common
value:
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Ê(bi) o
Normal distribution
Private values
Common value
z1 B + opkl
zt cl"-oa(on-kr)
1
F
"rlkz - kf
1
'rlkz - kf
ôp = ô6*
ôô*ôp=
Log-normal distri bution
Private values
Common value
q(op) fl4lpr 6p#
tc1
K
yÀ(c") fIzn",
k=1
o6* / E(b)
I-
^rlXr-kl-kpo,lÊ.(b\
o6*/ E(b)
o"# {k, -R - Rp6* t E(b\
K
The case of the log-normal distribution is presented in the appendix. All proofs and more
detailed explanations can be found in Bourgeon, 1994.
4. Application : tenders of soft wheat intervention stocks
The framework described above is applied to tenders of soft wheat intervention stocks 8. Such
an estimation heavely relies on several assumptions (in addition to the ones which are
necessary for a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium). Hence, for simplicity, we consider that
a separate tender applies to each lot. For a given lot, the highest bid is accepted if it is higher
than a minimum sale price, or reservation price, which we assume to be known ex anfe. (See
Elyakime et al., 1994, for an estimation method with secret reservation price).
Weekly tenders are presented in reports issued by the EU Cereals Management Committee.
These reports contain information about purchase prices of awarded lots, quantities of each lot,
and places where lots are located. Tenders apply to homogeneous lots by prefixing correctives,
according to differences in quality on the one hand and to the destination of exports on the
other hand (that is, to take into account freight costs but also to favor specific destinations).
The data set covers tenders held between March 1991 and June 1992, that is lo say 424
awarded lots. The main statistical features of used data are summarized in table 1.
Variables which can explain private or common values can be divided into three sets
- time variables, which reflect seasonal shifters ;
8 Oprn market tenders are a more complex means of awarding because both quantities and refunds are endogenous.
15
- price variables : posted and actual US export price (i.e. bonuses awarded within EEP are
taken into account) ; internal price, the level of which can act upon the timeliness to export in
the world market ; exchange rate of European Currency Unit (Ecu) versus US dollar ;
- quantity variables : EU and US exports, and total EU export awarded the same day, which is
related to the ex posf reservation price.
For each auction l, the variabte Of is the winning bid, expressed in green Ecu. The internal
price is expressed in French francs (the parity between the French franc and the green Ecu is
constant over the period of estimation), and world prices are expressed in US dollars.
Quantities are expressed in million tons.
Table 1
We assume that there are 15 bidding traders for each auction (that is, the major international
companies, some national or European shippers, and eventually cooperatives; for more details,
see Debatisse, 1984), which seems to be very close to the reality.
First, we present and comment on the linear estimations of the model, under both the normal
and the log-normal assumptions. These estimations allow us to characterize the effects of the
exogenous variables on the private values as well as on the ex ante signals of the common
value. After that, we will derive additional parameters which characterize the distributions of the
private values or of the signals.
4.1. Effecfs of economic variables on private and common values
The parameter estimates are given in table 2. The two assumptions concerning the
distributions of private values or signals produce a very satisfying fit. All variables are
significant under both distributional assumptions. Recall that in the log-normal case, estimated
parameters have to be interpreted as elasticities.
The exchange rate has a positive effect on bids: ceteris paribus, an increasing value for the US
dollar involves higher bids, expressed in Ecus. The elasticity is equal to one (1.079): any
change in the exchange rate only induces a mechanical adjustment of European traders' bids.
Average Minimum Maximum
Quantity per lot
(monthly average)
5 500 tonnes 4 600 tonnes
(February 1992)
7 600
tonnes
(June 1992)
Number of awarded lots per tender
(monthlv averaae\
7 1 36
(Julv 1992\
Purchase price, including the " technical
refund " (Ecus/tonne)
84.4 74.1 110.2
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Table 2
Distribution Normal Log-normal
Constant 22.353
(4.1)
6.210
(21.1)
Variables Parameters
ôZ1
ECU/US
(exchange rate Ecu/USD)
QUS
(US exports)
USP
(actual US export price)
ECP
(EU price)
14.351
(17.6)
- 4.847
(8.8)
0.587
(50.5)
- 0.057
c 23.2)
1.079
(17.0)
- 0.023
(- 8.4)
0.591
(3e.6)
- 0.889
(- 21.0)
R,
RMSE
0.908
3.00 %
0.877
3.23 o/o
Sfudenf sfatisfics between parenthe ses
US exports have a negative effect. When they increase, European traders have to minimize
their purchase price in order to stay price-competitive in the world market. However, one may
notice that the elasticity is very low (- 0.02).
One important result is the effect of the actual US export price. The price used in our
estimation is the fob US price (HRVl/), corrected by an average of bonuses. Traders' bids are
obviously determined by this export price. This is a confirmation of the leadership role that US
trade plays, and consequently that US export subsidy policy plays. Such a strong result stems,
no matter what estimated specification. Ceferis paribus, especially for the exchange rate, an
increase of 1 o/o of the US export price induces an increase of about 0.6 o/o of the European
traders' purchase price.
The internal price has a negative effect on winning bids. When this price increases it may be
less profitable to export to the world market rather than selling in the European market. So
traders decrease their bids 9.
Note that the effects of the quantities which are tendered for are never significant.
9 Note that the CAP retorm involves a decrease of intemat pices. Consequenfiy, such a measure would induce an
increase ot traders' bids. lt becomes /ess cosfly for the EC to se!! its interuention stocks onto the world market. For
example, if internal pices decrease of 10 percent, the EC can sell its interuenûon stocks at about a g percent higher
level, which has a positive effect on the European agricultural budget.
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4.2. Distribution of private and common values
Table 3 gives estimations of the distribution characteristics of private values and of signals of
the common value.
Table 3
Estimations of the mathematical expectation and of the residual standard
deviations of the winning bids
Ê101 = 84'44 Ecus
Normality assumption :66* = 2.522
Log-normality assumptiofl r ô6* = 2.730
Estimated expectations and standard deviations
of private values and of signals of the common value
Private values 6p Êo êêv 6plv
Normal
Log-normal
8.93
0.1335
11.20
424.43
73.3
72.0
12.2 o/o
13.4 o/o
Signals of the common
value
oc ctg ô 6clë
Normal
Log-normal
4.60
0.0582
23.15
502.73
85.2
85.29
5.2 o/o
5.8 o/o
lf the private values paradigm prevails with a normal distribution, the average of private values
is about 15 percent less than the winning bid, or the second highest value. The standard
deviation of these private values is about 9 Ecus (around an average of 73 Ecus), that is 12
percent. This dispersion of values is not small: 90 percent of the private values are, on
average, in the interval [56, 91]. So, if the private values paradigm holds, the segmentation of
the world market among European traders would be significant. Similar results are generated
using the log-normal assumption.
Moreover it is noticeable that the average of the private values is always considerably less than
the winning bid (which is the seller's revenue) corresponding to each lot (see figure 3). One can
observe this gap on average over all the observations, with a mean of private values 1fi equal
to 72 Ecus (under the normal assumption), and a mean of the winning bids (Ê(bI) equal to
84.4 Ecus. Further, this average of the private values converted into US dollars is always
considerably less than the actual US export price (see figure 3, where the actual US export
price is evaluated from the HRW export price, minus an average of bonuses, plus an average
freight rate from the USA to Western Europe). For the latter case, the difference in quality is
not sufficient to explain the gap. For the former case, such a situation seems rather unrealistic.
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Whereas the aim of the traders is to speculate against the Commission when bidding to get
refunds (or to purchase intervention stocks), it would mean that they always loose money on
average. Actually the average of the traders' valuation (approximated by D would be less than
what they pay (that is the winning bids b). Thus, the assumption of private values does not
seem to fit to the empirical knowledge of the market.
lf the paradigm of private values holds, that is if there is a segmentation of the world market
among traders which leads to different valuations for the same cereall0 , that would mean that
international prices are very high, relatively to European traders' valuations. Actually, the US
export price (HRW) and the winning bids (in terms of resale price onto the world market) are
very close, as it can be seen on the figure 3. Quantities exported at these prices account for a
large part of world grain trade 11 , and they are 20 lo 25 percent higher than the average of
European traders' valuations. Then, those who have the lowest private values would have to
stock up at a very high price, relatively to the value they attach to the item. That does not seem
to be credible.
Figure 3
US export price, Winning bids, and Averages of the Private values
USD/t
150 T
I
I140 +
I
I130 *
120 r
HRW
Winning bids
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
161 201 24',t 281
rwôrded lotr ol European soft wh€t
Avcregc of Privatc Vrlucs
321 361 40141 81 121
The winning bids and the estimated averages of private values are converted from Ecu to US
dollar and expressed in terms of resale price onto the world market. HRW is the US export
price.
1o0o in t"^" of quality, and after having taken into account a conective for differences of freight costs.
' ' HRW accounts for 50 percent of US soft wheat expotts, and exports from interuention sfocks represent 20 percent of
European soft wheat expotts.
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Figure 4
US export price, Winning bids, and Common value
USD/t
45-
I
I
I
zsi
I
105
95
85
75
65
- 
HRW
"""'Winningbide
LOmmon vâluê
:'.,
41 81 1 21 1 61 201 24't 281
rwârded lob ol European soft whet
321 361 401
Conversely, if the common value paradigm prevails, which means that bidders know the
uniqueness of the price after bidding, but do not know its value before bidding, then the
dispersion of ex-ante personal approximations is rather low. The standard deviation of these
signals is 5 to 6 percent of the average common value, whatever assumption is made about
the distribution of the signals. Under the normal assumption, this standard deviation is 4.6
Ecus, while the average common value is about 85 Ecus. This average common value is the
same for both distributional assumptions. The estimated common value, converted into a US
dollar export price, is either nearly equal to, or slightly lower than the US export price
(evaluated as previously) (see figure 4).
Moreover it is quite noticeable that this common value is nearly equal to the average of the
winning bids (84.4 Ecus). That can be seen for each lot (see figure4). With 15 bidders, the
competition seems to be sufficient to lead to this closeness: here the seller's revenue (equal to
the winning bid) and the bidders'valuation are the same, on average, and consequenfly there is
no rent for the buyers.
Then, the assumption of common value seems more realistic than the private values' one. lt is
not possible to decide between these two assumptions with a statistical test, but we can prefer
the common value paradigm on the basis of economic teachings which are drawn from
estimation results. The choice of common value would indicate two main features. On the one
hand, the common value paradigm entails the uniqueness of the price reference in the world
grain market, in spite of the complexity of its organisation and the speculative behaviors of
traders (hedging in futures markets, possibility of re-selling refunds, and so on). This conclusion
is consistent with experts' opinions who readily speak of < the > world price, but also, for
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example, with the European Commission which explicitly takes into account an US export price
to determine the necessary and acceptable refund (Ferret, 1991). On the other hand, the
closeness between the common valuation of traders and the Commission's revenue points out
the efficiency of the awarding procedure, because traders buy intervention stocks at a level
very close to their own valuation.
Conclusion
ln this paper we have pointed out the importance of refund awarding procedures for EU cereal
exports. An analysis of these procedures can be drawn from auction theory.
The derivation of structural approaches of uncompetitive markets like tender procedures has
provided important theoretical results that have not yet been completely exploited by empirical
work. This research has presented a simple econometric method which holds for both common
and private values paradigms. The application concerns an important feature of the European
agricultural policy, namely, the refund awarding policy. This econometric method leads to a
linear least squares estimator which is the same for the common value model and for the
private values model, if an identical assumption is made on private values or signals'
distributions. The outcome is the simplicity of the estimation procedure, since only an ordinary
least squares estimator is needed to measure the shifters' effects. Specific additional
estimations are used to characterize private values or signals' distributions. Moreover, for a
given set of explanatory variables, this method proves that the effects of these variables are
the same under both the private values and the common value assumptions. Further, because
of the use of the same regression for both paradigms, no specification test can be used to
decide between these paradigms.
The estimation results show that European traders' behavior is highly dependent on US export
prices. This behavior is also sensitive to US export quantities. Otherwise, the elasticity of
traders' purchase offers to the US dollar exchange rate is equal to one. This means that
exchange rate movements only induce mechanical adjustments. Lastly, the timeliness to export
in the world market is significantly influenced by domestic price variations.
The characterization of private values or signals' distributions highlights some features of the
market. lf traders have different and independent private values for cereals when bidding, the
dispersion of these values is 12 to 13 percent of the mean value, with this, on average, 15
percent less than the winning bid. These results might prove heterogenety and significant
segmentation of the grain world market. But several reasons indicate that the private values
assumption can not turn out to be correct here. Actually, the estimation results show that, on
average, the traders' private values should be lower than the purchase price they accept to pay
for cereals to be exported. This does not seem to be plausible, given the strategic and
speculative behavior of traders.
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Conversely, if traders determine their optimal bidding as if grain to be exported has the same
ex posf value, but if they do not know it precisely ex ante, then, among bidders, ex ante
personal approximations of the common value are very close. The ex ante knowledge of ex
posf valuation seems nearly perfect, and the mean winning bid, that is the seller's revenue,
equals the ex posf common value. On average, the tender procedure used to sell European
soft wheat intervention stocks leads to efficient competition among traders, who would gain
from no profit. The common value assumption seems to fit, better than the private values
assumption, the reality of the market. lf this paradigm holds, this meâns that an unique
reference acts upon the agents' behaviors at the world level. Further, the estimation results
confirm the leadership role that US trade plays: the US export price remains the unique
reference point (even if it can sometimes be a response to European export subsidy policy).
Finally, one has to point out that competition among European (and world) traders and the
information available to each of them, imply that the tender procedure used by the EC is an
efficient one, because no gain is extracted by traders.
Appendix
Log-normal distribution of private values
Here, we assume that logarithms of private values are normally distributed with mean
lnV, = 2f=,pr tn(41,) and variance ofr, where (z*)çt,...,x are explanatory variables of private
values (eventually including a constant), and (pfx=1 
,K are parameters.
Then, one can show that the mathematical expectation of the winning bids is
E(bh = 
"-"3r2 Jl-""o ' 
olor(9lV
K
= an(op)flr,rer
tc1
(8)
Where: rr(op) = ,-o7rz fæ"oo' a1re,r46)l
And, taking logarithms:
hqob)= /n(r,(or)) * f neù pr
k=1
An estimation of /n(b) can be obtained with ordinary least squares. But if the vectot (zx)a,.,x
includes a constant, it is not possible to get an estimation of Bs on the one hand, and an
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estimation of tr(or) (and then of 6p) on the other hand. The estimation only provides with a
constant equal to tr(oo) + po.
The same problem of identification of parameters than in the normal case appears here. We
will see later how an additional estimation can give an approximation of or, and then of the
constant included in (zp)6, 
,11.
The expression (8) shows that the mathematical expectation of the winning bids is equal to the
mathematical expectation of the private values, multiplied by a coefficient tr(or). This multiplier
increases with the number n of bidders, which reflects the increasing competition among
bidders. That is, for a given or, the larger is the number of bidders, the larger is the ratio
between the winning bid and the average of the private values. But tn(or) is a decreasing
function of oo: the larger is the standard deviation of private values, the higher can be the
second highest private value. Otherwise, when the number of bidders is large enough (say at
least n = 5 for a standard deviation less or equal to 1), tp(op) is greater than one. ln this case,
we see that the mathematical expectation of the winning bids is always larger than the
mathematical expectation of the private values.
Lastly, to solve the previous identification problem, the standard deviation of the private values
can be expressed in terms of the standard deviation of the winning bids (ou, ), through an
implicit relation. This one can be approximated to get:
.. 
ob* lE(b\
wpt F-----
Vr,, - kl - kloo* lÊ(b\
Empirical approximations of o6w âfld E(b) give an estimation of oo, which allows to derive ps.
Log-normal distribution of signals
Assume that /n a1 is normally distributed with mean ln(c) = E[r"r tn(zf1 and variance of, th.
mathematical expectation of the winning bids is given by the following expression
e(ol) = E@Iy,@à)
= yn(o") ,,f}""o' dlo(01'
K
= T'n(oc) flzne
k=1
ï'n(oo) = yr("r) l}e"otdlo(01'where:
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and
Then, when taking logarithms of the mathematical expectation of the winning bids:
tnqoh)= /n(y',(oJ) * f neù o* (e)
tc1
ll (z1x)p, 
,a includes a constant, then q, = (tu ô). The same linear regression as in the case of
private values, within the assumption of log-normal distribution, gives an estimation of ô. That
is, with a regression of ln b" against (ln zy)p,..,x by ordinary least squares. Here the constant
term in this regressioh is /n(y'r(oJ) + oo and it is not possible to direcily get o" and oo.
y',(o") is always less than one but very close to one when o" is small. So, within the log-normal
assumption again, the mathematical expectation of the winning bids is, on a average, always
smaller than the common value c1. The "winne/s curse" does not hold here. Othenryise, one
have to notice that y'n(o") increases with n but decreases with oo.
Lastly, it is possible to derive the standard deviation of the signals from the mean and the
standard deviation of the winning bids. An implicit relation can be found between o", E(ô) and
oo* . Then, an approximation of o" is given by:
tE(b\o
oc# kz-k k1o6" lE(b\1-
where kr and k2 are the first and the second moments of IJg.
Empirical approximations of ob* ând E(b) give an estimation of oo. Then the constant oo in the
expression of q can be derived.
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